Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Contents -- List of Tables and Figures -- Acknowledgments -- Prologue -- Introduction. The Politics of Municipal Takeovers: Power, Participation, and Protest -- 1. Why Cities Go Broke and Flint's Financial Collapse -- 2. Saving Cities from Themselves: How States Respond to Urban Fiscal Crises -- 3. The Policy Paradox of Municipal Takeover: How the Policy Creates Politics -- 4. Contextualizing the Flint Case: Race, Class, and Contentious Politics -- 5. The "Development Agenda": Implementing Municipal Takeover in Flint -- 6. From Development Agenda to Development Regime: Allocating Benefits and Burdens and Interpreting Winners and Losers -- 7. Defending Democracy: Responding to the Municipal Takeover -- 8. From Fiscal Emergency to Public Health Emergency: Differing Responses to the Flint Water Crisis / Co-authored with Amanda D. Clark -- Conclusion. Summary Findings, Implications, and Recommendations -- Appendix 1. Research Design and Methodology -- Appendix 2 -- Appendix 3 -- Notes -- References -- Index.

Related Content: Balfour (PAR November/December 2017)Related Content: Zeemering (PAR November/December 2017)Related Content: Hamilton (PAR November/December 2017)Related Content: Ali (PAR November/December 2017)Related Content: Schachter (PAR November/December 2017)Related Content: Holzer (PAR November/December 2017)

Municipal takeovers proceed by a state declaring that a municipality is in fiscal crisis and placing it in receivership, handing over most local processes to a state-appointed manager. This policy of aggressive state intervention calls into question two principles of local autonomy enshrined in home rule: that allowing local matters to be handled by local authority removes the need for state special legislation and that giving local governments functional autonomy allows them to solve problems without state intervention. This article presents case studies of New Jersey and Michigan to examine differences in home rule protection as well as approaches to municipal takeover.

Because governmental structures put in place to mitigate disaster risks and aid communities in the disaster recovery process have, at times, proven to be inadequate, reliance on other types of organizations is necessary for some communities to survive. Although there are a number of different actors that played a role in the reestablishment of communities within New Orleans since Hurricane Katrina took place, the Mary Queen of Vietnam (MQVN) Catholic Church is a prime example of how a community‐based organization stepped in to address the needs of its community. This article examines how MQVN garnered social capital within its surrounding community to pursue successful community development in the absence of and opposition to governmental support and political resistance. This article will first review the government failure and decrease in civic trust that fostered a robust third‐sector response in disaster recovery and redevelopment. Then, using social capital theory, the article supports the notion that civic distrust and confidence is derived from government and institutional performance, rather than increasing individualism or declining social trust. Finally, implications for federal disaster policy and third‐sector disaster interventions are proposed.

Municipal takeovers are a state policy ostensibly designed to address urban fiscal crises by "temporarily" taking over local government, suspending local control, and implementing sweeping austerity measures. Although framed as "apolitical," takeovers have the capacity to reshape local democracy. These changes radically rearrange how decisions are made, who has access to decision makers, and, ultimately, who is in power. Using a policy-centered approach, we compare the cases of Camden, New Jersey and Flint, Michigan, illustrating how variations in policy design and localized implementation reshaped the local political landscape in different ways. While the Camden takeover institutionalized the emergent "community development regime," Flints' grassroots activists and community-based organizations destabilized the emergent regime.